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Abstract The UN Framework Convention of Climate Change 15th Conference of the
Parties Copenhagen Accord has been followed up by national pledges of greenhouse gas
emissions reductions in the year 2020 without specifying measures to enforce actions. As a
consequence, the capacity of parties to fulfil their obligations is of basic interest. This article
outlines the effects of full compliance with pledges on greenhouse gas emissions, economic
growth, and trade. The study is based on the global computable general equilibrium model
global responses to anthropogenic changes in the environment (GRACE) distinguishing
between fossil and non-fossil energy use. Global emissions from fossil fuels in 2020 turn out
to be 15 % lower than in a business as usual scenario and 3 % below the global emissions
from fossil fuels in 2005. China and India increase their emissions to 1 % and 5 % above
business as usual levels in 2020. India and Russia increase their net export of steel
corresponding to around 30 and 45 % of their production levels in 2020. In spite of some
leakage of energy intensive production also to China, we find that structural change remains the
dominant factor behind the rapid reduction of CO2 emission intensity in China towards 2020.
Keywords General equilibrium . Global climate policy regime . Copenhagen Accord .
CO2 emissions
1 Introduction
The fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), took note of the Copenhagen
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Accord of 18 December 2009 by way of decision 2/CP.15. The key sentence in this decision
is:
«We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as
documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global
emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2°Celsius, and take
action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity.»(§2).
Following this decision, major players have pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
or carbon intensity by 2020.1 Several developed countries have provided quantified economy-
wide emissions targets for 2020, while many developing countries have offered nationally
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for the same year (UNFCCC 2010) often in the form
of intensity targets (carbon dioxide (CO2) or greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP).
2
Several reports have analyzed the expected climate impacts of these pledges (Perry 2010;
Rogelj et al. 2010; Stern and Taylor 2010; UNEP 2010; den Elzen et al. 2010, 2011a, and
UNEP 2010). Generally, they find the pledges to be inadequate with respect to the 2°Celsius
target (although the 2°Celsius target is of a longer term nature than the pledges). Nordhaus
(2010) have analyzed the longer term implication of the 2° scenario.
In this paper we will, by use of a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
investigate the effect on global emissions and the economic costs to major players of fulfilling
their pledges. McKibbin et al. (2010) has provided the most analogue analysis to ours, followed
by more recent studies (Dellink et al. 2010; den Elzen et al. 2011b; Peterson et al. 2011). Jotzo
(2010) compares the pledges according to different metrics like absolute emission reductions
related to a common base year (2005), reductions in emission intensities, per capita emissions
and reductions relative to business as usual emissions pathways.
A broad international agreement would facilitate a market for CO2 emission reductions
and modify the costs of mitigation, thus reducing the gap in mitigation costs among
countries. COP15 did not reach this kind of agreement and instead countries made their
pledges separately and uncoordinated. Parallel and uncoordinated actions might lead to
highly different mitigation costs among countries imposing different constraints on econom-
ic growth and incentives for international trade than a common price on CO2. Possibly,
carbon leakage in terms of shifting polluting industries to countries without binding green-
house gas emission targets might be more marked. Among countries without binding
constraints are those pledging flexible greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets, like a carbon
intensity target, as do China, India and Brazil. China is a country with substantial coal
reserves and the capacity to expand its energy intensive industries like steel and cement.
India and Brazil are also candidates to taking a higher share of global production and trade in
energy intensive goods. Due to such indirect or spillover effects, model based analyses are
needed to trace the economic implications and identify the net effects on economic growth
and GHG emissions associated with the Copenhagen Accord. The final outcome in terms of
global emissions reductions is likely to differ from the sum of the single reduction pledges as
implemented.
In this paper our main purpose is to assess the effects of the Copenhagen Accord pledges
on global and regional CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and further to assess the
mitigation costs by countries and regions. As a complementary exercise we compare our
results with results from other studies and look at changes in trade of energy intensive goods.
1 The total number of Parties that have expressed their intention to be listed as agreeing to the Accord is 140.
See http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php (accessed December 13. 2010)
2 For further details, see http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php
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We compare the results of implementing the Copenhagen Accord pledges with a business
as usual scenario roughly corresponding to the reference scenario as presented in World
Energy Outlook 2009 (IEA 2009). For this purpose we use the GRACE model developed at
Center for International Climate and Environmental Research–Oslo (CICERO) for
integrated air quality and climate policy analysis (Aaheim and Rive 2005).
2 The GRACE model
The GRACE model is an 8 region, 15 sector computable general equilibrium model (CGE) of
global economic development, energy use and GHG emissions. A CGE describes the supply
and demand by producers and households in markets for goods and services, based on prices
and cost. In each period (year) it is assumed that equilibrium is achieved in the sense that supply
equals demand in all markets and that all available resources are utilized. Basic assumptions are
also that producersmaximize profit and consumers maximize utility from consumption of goods
and services. The strength of such model approaches is giving us the opportunity to assess
policy changes in a consistent way, taking limitations of resources (labour, produced capital,
natural resources), future technological change and responses to price changes into account.
Within each region and time period the endowment of production factors, i.e. labour, capital
and natural resources are exogenous. Labour is floating freely among production activities within
a region, whereas capital and natural resources are activity-specific and cannot be reallocated
among sectors. The model assumes full utilization of all available resources within each region.
For our study we have introduced a worldwide, disaggregated electricity sector with
specific technologies for power generation based on coal, gas, oil, or a non-fossil option
(hydro, nuclear, solar, bio and wind). Fixed input–output factors and sunk capital costs in
each of the 4 electricity producing sectors modify the short term response to price variation
on fossil fuel consumption.
An updated version of GRACE is described in a recent application by Rive (2010) and
used in this paper. The GRACE model is calibrated around the global trade analysis project
(GTAP) v7 database with 2004 as a base year (Badri and Walmsley 2008), named after the
Global Trade Analysis Project of Purdue University, the basis for a network compiling
statistics on trade, production and consumption (GTAP 2012). We limit our study to consider
only CO2 emissions from fossil fuels combustion and use emission data from an auxiliary
database provided by GTAP (Lee 2007). The 8 regions are USA, Canada, EU, Japan, China,
India, Russia and the rest of the world (RoW). The 15 aggregated production sectors are
listed in Table 3 in the Appendix.
Trade is modelled as bilateral with substitution among regional contributions. The
substitution elasticities are based on those in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) emissions prediction and poplicy analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al. 2005).
Income to a region includes fixed income shares of the remuneration to the primary
factors of production (labour, capital and natural resources) and direct and indirect taxes
collected by the regional governments.
Saving is a fixed share of total income by region. A virtual global bank collects all
savings and allocates investments to regions and sectors with the highest observed returns to
capital. The reallocation is subject to elasticities of transformation. The returns to capital are
equalized in the long run.
Economic growth is mainly driven by savings and investments, but is also determined by
population growth, change in the availability of natural resources and technological change.
The regional rates of technological change are assumed to be the same for both the baseline
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scenario and a policy scenario where the Copenhagen Accord is implemented. This is clearly
a simplification, as climate policies normally would affect the rate of technological change,
in particular the rate of energy efficiency improvement. However, the time horizon of this
study is relatively short. A major share of the fossil fuels is used in electricity production and
heavy industries where plants have long lifetimes and new capital formation takes years and
even decades to materialize. On this background we consider the technology of 2020 only
modestly affected by the Copenhagen Accord pledges of 2010. Political uncertainty sur-
rounding the prospects of implementation might be another reason why technology might
not differ substantially between a business-as-usual scenario and the Copenhagen Accord
scenario. Hence newly developed technology in response to current policies might be
expected to affect emissions predominantly at a later stage.
3 The business as usual (BAU) scenario
The baseline or business-as-usual (BAU) scenario depicts a plausible path of future economic
development with average annual growth rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during 2004–
2020 as reported in Table 1. The BAU scenario assumes no new carbon abatement policy by any
region and serves as a reference for the policy analysis associated with regional pledges in the
Copenhagen Accord.
China and India are assumed to have average annual growth rates above 5 % over the
period to 2020. The industrialized regions have on the other hand average annual growth
rates between 1 and 2 %. Russia falls in the middle with an average annual growth rate of
3.5 %. Globally, the economic growth is 2.3 % per year on average in BAU.
The CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by regions in our BAU scenario are
reported in Fig. 1. All regions emit more in 2020 compared with 2005 in the baseline
scenario, although Japan barely so.
Changes in CO2 emission intensities (emissions per unit GDP) in the various regions in
our BAU scenario are reported in Fig. 2. We notice a general improvement in emission
intensities of about 1 % per year in many regions. Russia and India are above that level, with
India having an improvement of more than 2 % per year, but the real outlier is China, where
the intensity improvement in the BAU scenario is close to 5 % per year for the period to
2020. We will come back to a discussion of this in Section 6.
4 The Copenhagen Accord scenario (SN1)
The Copenhagen Accord scenario, which we designate SN1, reflects a situation where no
binding international agreement is reached, but where major economies and emitters follow
their own independent climate policies to fulfil their pledges relating to the Copenhagen
Accord as shown in Table 2. Some of the pledges cover other aspects than emission levels or
emission intensities. For instance China has put forward a target related to the share of non-
Table 1 Average annual growth in GDP in the business as usual (BAU) scenario over the period 2004–2020.
Per cent
USA EU Canada Japan China Russia India RoW
1.6 1.4 1.8 1.2 6.4 3.5 5.4 2.3
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fossil energy in their primary energy mix, and also a reforestation target. Here, we only take
into account the pledges made with regard to the overall emissions levels or emissions
intensities as shown in the last column of Table 2.
The basis for these voluntary mitigation efforts is the shared understanding of the climate
change issues and need for action. In this scenario, the European Union (EU), the United
States of America (USA) and China behave as leaders and implement their commitments to
Fig. 1 CO2 emissions in 2005 and 2020 according to the BAU scenario
Fig. 2 Average annual changes in CO2 emission intensities over the period 2005–2020 in the BAU scenario
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the UNFCCC. We assume that India, Japan, Canada, and Russia follow up, accepting the
leaders’ actions to be sufficient basis for their conditional commitments as stated in their
pledges (UNFCCC 2010). The rest of the world (RoW) is assumed to keep the emissions at
the same level as in the BAU scenario.
The regional pledges are implemented by introducing local competitive carbon markets
within each region. These carbon markets are assumed to be economic efficient in the sense
that mitigation takes place where it is most economical marginal costs until the marginal cost
of CO2 emissions reductions are the same for all sectors within the region. However, the
marginal costs of reducing the CO2 emissions (CO2 price in the regional carbon market) is
Table 2 Copenhagen accord pledges
Region Reductions and actions Base year Implementation
Canada 17 %, to be aligned with the final
economy-wide emission target of the
United States in enacted legislation.
2005 Reduce CO2 emissions by 17 %
by 2020 with 2005 as base year.
EU 20/30 %. As part of a global and
comprehensive agreement for the
period beyond 2012, provided other
developed countries commit themselves
to comparable emission reductions and
that developing countries contribute
adequately according to their
responsibilities and capabilities.
1990 Reduce CO2 emissions by 30 % by
2020 with 1990 as base year.
Participants in ETS reduce by 30 %
by 2020 and other participants by
10 % by 2020. Relative to 2005, the
EU reduced emissions by almost
25 % in 2020.
Japan 25 %, premised on the establishment
of a fair and effective international
framework in which all major economies
participate and on agreement by those
economies on ambitious targets.
1990 Reduce CO2 emissions by 25 % by
2020 with 1990 as base year.
Compared to 2005, the reduction
is almost 40 %.
Russian
federation
15–25 % provided: 1990 Reduce CO2 emissions by 15 % by
2020 with 1990 as base year.
Compared to 2005 level, Russia
reduces the emission level by 22 %
in 2020.
- Adequate provision for the potential
of Russian forests in the context of
their contribution to the fulfilment of
emission reduction obligations
- The adoption by all major emitters of
legally binding GHG emission
reduction obligations.
USA In the range of 17 %, in conformity
with anticipated US energy and
climate legislation.
2005 Reduce CO2 emissions by 17 % by
2020 with 2005 as base year for all
sectors. A 25 USD upper bound on
quota price is implemented.
China China will endeavour to lower its carbon
dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by
40–45 % by 2020 compared to the 2005
level, increase the share of non-fossil
fuels in primary energy consumption to
around 15 % by 2020 and increase
forest coverage by 40 million hectares
and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion
cubic meters by 2020 from the
2005 levels.
2005 Reduce the CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP by 40 % by 2020 compared to
the 2005 level.
India 20–25 % reduction in emission intensity
and a deviation from BAU of at
least 7 %.
2005 Reduce the CO2 emission per unit
of GDP by 20 % by 2020 compared
to the 2005 level.
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expected to differ among regions as they have different ambitions and potential for
mitigation.
4.1 EU
The overall target of EU is a 20 % reduction of CO2 emissions from 1990 level by 2020 and
30 % reduction conditional on behaviour of other parties. In the model we adopt 30 %
reduction for sectors participating in the emission trading system (EU-ETS) and 10 % for
other sectors. Sectors allowed to trade CO2 are iron and steel, cement, other manufacturing,
electricity generation, crude oil, gas, coal mining, air, sea and other transportation. All
carbon allowances in the power sector are assumed to be 100 % auctioned from 2010
whereas other sectors in EU-ETS will receive transitional allowances free of charge accord-
ing to EU rules. Free allowances will be phased out and auctions implemented progressively
from 12 % in 2010, 20 % in 2013 to 70 % in 2020. Sectors that do not participate in ETS,
among them households, face the target of 10 % reduction from the 2005 level by 2020 and
the target will be achieved by a carbon tax.
4.2 USA
The target of the USA is a 17 % reduction in CO2 emissions compared to the 2005 level. A cap
and trade system (C&T) by assumption covers the same sectors as the EU-ETS and provides the
potential advantage of an upper bound of 25 USD per ton CO2. If the carbon price in the C&T
goes above 25USD per ton CO2, the participants only pay 25 USD and the government will pay
the difference. For other sectors, the 17 % target is achieved by a carbon tax.
4.3 China
China will reach the target of 40–45 % reduction of carbon intensity by 2020 compared with
the 2005 level. The other targets for non-fossil share of primary energy use and forest are not
considered here.
4.4 India
India will reduce the emission intensity of its GDP by 20–25 % by 2020 in comparison to the
2005 level. This is to be achieved by a tax on CO2 by industries and private households.
4.5 Canada, Japan and the Russian federation
In spite of Canada’s exit from the Kyoto Protocol we include the somewhat hypothetical
assumption that Canada will reduce its carbon emissions by 17 % compared with the 2005
level. Japan will reduce by 25 % relative to the 1990 level; and Russia by 15 % of 1990
level, following their pledges. For the rest of the world, the emissions in the policy scenario
do not exceed the level in the BAU scenario.
5 Results and analysis
First, comparing annual average GDP growth over the period 2005–2020 in our policy
scenario (SN1) and the business-as-usual scenario (BAU), we find that the impacts of the
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Copenhagen Accord on average annual GDP growth rates are very small, less than one tenth
of a percentage point. USA, EU, Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation, as well as the Rest
of the World (RoW) all experience a slight decline in growth rates. Perhaps counter
intuitively, the GDP growth of both China and India increase slightly as the policy measures
are introduced. The reason for this is that the pledges of China and India are fulfilled already
in the BAU scenario due to rapid economic growth and efficiency improvement. This holds
even though we have a lower economic growth for China in BAU than the other studies we
compare with. Hence, the intensity targets of China and India are not binding in our
Copenhagen Accord scenario. Also, the slightly constrained economic growth of other
regions is not large enough to reduce their GDP by harming their export. Rather, when
other large regions introduce stricter emission policies, the economies of China and India
tends to grow because of cheaper fossil fuels and carbon leakage of high emitting industries.
Figure 3 shows the emissions levels in 2020 in the two scenarios (BAU and SN1)
together with 2005 emissions. Only China and India emit more in the Copenhagen Accord
scenario than in the BAU scenario since they have higher economic growth and only flexible
targets of carbon intensity. The global emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2020
decrease with 4.6 GtCO2 or 15 % compared with the baseline scenario, from 30.2 to 25.6
GtCO2.
The pledges are related to the base years 1990 or 2005. Even with the same base year and
pledges the economic growth potentials of regions might differ and determine how strict the
carbon policies are felt regionally. When looking at the reduction of emissions in 2020
compared with the BAU in 2020, Japan is by far undertaking the largest reduction with
38 %. Then follows EU with 30 %, Canada and USA with 22–24 % and the Russian
Federation with a little less than 10 %. Having flexible targets, the emissions levels of China
and India are relatively unpredictable. India is increasing its emissions by 5 %, which is far
from complying with India’s pledge to reduce emissions to at least 7 % below BAU level in
2020, as BAU is depicted in our study. China’s emissions are only slightly increased to
approximately 1 % above the BAU level in 2020.
Fig. 3 CO2 emissions levels in 2005 and 2020
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The development of the regional emission intensities in the BAU and the policy scenario
are shown in Fig. 4. Reductions in emissions intensity comes from energy efficiency
improvements, fuel switch and structural changes in the economy. Moving away from more
energy intensive industries towards service industries is a rapidly on-going process in
developing countries with a high share of manufacturing as in China. We note that emission
intensity reductions from the BAU to the policy scenario are quite considerable in most
regions, in Japan in particular, while we detect a slight increase in emission intensity in
China and India, although their pledges on energy intensity are still fulfilled. These increases
reflect that China and India take a higher share of emission intensive industries like steel and
cement in a global context, and that this effect on energy intensity of the Copenhagen
Accord dominates the effect of an increased share of service industries in their slightly
increased GDPs.3
What are the costs for each region of implementing the Copenhagen Accord? Since China
and India already meet their pledges of reduced energy intensity in the BAU scenario, there
are no costs for them–they actually benefit from the implementation of the Copenhagen
Accord in terms of an increase in GDP. The other regions may suffer to different extent from
their pledges. This can be illustrated by virtual carbon market prices or marginal costs of
carbon reduction by region in 2020, see Fig. 5. Japan has the highest marginal costs of
reducing carbon emissions (114 USD/tCO2) and Russia has the lowest (10 USD/tCO2). The
differences in marginal costs are moderate for the other four regions: EU, USA, Canada, and
the rest of the world, all within the range of 21–27 USD/tCO2−
Interestingly, the cost of CO2 reductions in the US stays below the (hypothetical) upper
limit (USD 25) of the quota price in the US carbon trading market. Hence, subsidies to keep
emissions low may seem unnecessary, which is convenient for a debt ridden US economy.
Japan’s pledge involves almost 40 % reduction compared with the 2005 emission level.
Japan is the only country expected to have a negative annual growth in primary energy use. In
the IEA reference scenario the decline is 0.2 % per year. A reduction in primary energy use will
initially hold back the costs of reducing CO2 emissions, but as ambitions for emissions
reductions rise it will become increasingly expensive. The emission intensity in Japan’s BAU
scenario is falling approximately 1 % per year–about the same as in EU, US and Canada, while
in the policy scenario, Japan’s emission intensity is reduced 4.5 % per year on average, about as
fast as China’s (Fig. 4). RoW represents countries with a low energy intensity, hence emissions
reductions also turn out to be relatively expensive (23 USD/tCO2).
Generally, purchaser prices on fossil fuels differ across regions due to market regulations
and regional policies with regard to taxes and subsidies. Figure 6 shows the effects on
regional fossil fuel prices in 2020 in going from the BAU to the policy scenario. Prices are
reduced relative to the BAU paths in all regions for all of the fossil fuels, generally most for
coal, followed by gas and oil. China differs from the other regions in experiencing a lower
reduction in coal and gas price growth as compared with the price reduction of oil. Also, the
price reductions are less in China, Russia and India than in other regions, as demand for
these fuels are reduced modestly or even increased as a consequence of the pledges made in
the Copenhagen Accord. These costs occur in spite of the option to switch from fossil to
non-fossil fuel as feedstock in electricity production. However, due to linear technologies in
electricity production and sunk capital costs, this substitution effect is a time consuming
process and does not offer an easy escape from mitigation costs during the time horizon of
this study.
3 Note that India’s pledge to reduce emissions to 7 % below BAU in 2020 is not implemented in our policy
scenario.
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The fall in fuel prices encourage energy intensive industries in countries without binding
emissions constraints even further. An illustration of this carbon leakage is shown in Fig. 7a,
depicting changes in net export in value terms of steel and cement in 2020 going from the
BAU scenario to the policy scenario (SN1). Figure 7b shows change in net export as a
percentage of the BAU domestic production in 2020. We see that net export of steel is
reduced in most countries, but increases in China, Russia and India. RoW is losing export
markets, being less able to compete with more rapidly growing economies with high
Fig. 4 Average annual growth rates of CO2 emission intensities from 2005 to 2020 in the BAU and the policy
scenario (SN1)
Fig. 5 The marginal costs of Copenhagen pledges by regions in 2020
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investment levels and capacities to phase in more efficient technologies. This occurs in spite
of RoW experiencing larger reductions in regional prices of coal and gas than China, India
and Russia. For cement the picture is more mixed, as cement is not traded globally to the
same degree as steel.
Russia undertakes the largest expansion of steel exports relative to their BAU production
in 2020, with more than 40 % increase. India comes next with nearly 30 % increase for steel
and 25 % for cement. Leakages to China are also positive, but of a smaller relative size.
6 Energy intensities: history and pledges
Results as presented above are influenced by the fact that the pledges made in the
Copenhagen Accord are not binding for China and India. This is again a partial reflection
of the assumptions made in formulating their BAU scenarios. For instance, the average
annual reduction in CO2 emission intensity in our BAU scenario for China is close to 5 %
per year (cf. Fig. 2) ensuring that the Copenhagen pledge of China is not a binding
constraint. A reasonable question then is whether this rate of emission intensity reduction
is realistic. We will approach this question by comparing the rate of intensity reduction in the
BAU scenario for China with historical data and with similar data from some other recent
studies.
Looking at history we get a mixed answer. Figure 8 shows emission intensity reductions
in regions over various time periods. Most regions show reduction rates of 1–3 % per year
China is one of the exceptions, with an average reduction rate of more than 5 % per year for
the period 1980–2000. Thereafter, however, the reduction in China is reversed to a (small)
increase for the period 2000–2007 and the whole period 1980–2007 saw a reduction in
emission intensity of somewhat less than 4 % per year. Clearly continued improvement in
Fig. 6 Difference in annual growth rate of fossil fuel prices between the policy scenario (SN1) and the BAU
scenario
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emission intensity of the order of 4–5 % per year is not coming ‘automatically’. Hence, the
experience over the last decade could lead us to question if China’s pledges are feasible
based only on efficiency improvements as depicted in our BAU-scenario.
The 12th five-year plan adopted for the period 2011–2015 in China, stipulates as one
target a 17 % reduction in emissions intensity. The BAU reduction in emissions intensity
corresponds closely to this target.
Generally the main focus of both policy and analysis is on the impact of technical
energy efficiency improvements. However, in a rapidly developing economy like
China’s and India’s, structural changes might also contribute to reductions in overall
emission intensities.
Fig. 7 a Difference in net export of steel and cement in 2020 between the policy (SN1) and BAU scenario. b
Difference in net export of steel and cement in 2020 between the policy (SN1) and BAU scenario as share of
domestic production in BAU
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In Fig. 9 we illustrate to what extent reductions in carbon intensities rely on technology
versus structural change related to impacts of income growth, consumer preferences and
trade as emerging through general equilibrium effects. The direct contribution to a reduction
in carbon intensity is associated with what happens if sector composition of GDP is fixed as
in the base year and the economy and the scale of each activity is adjusted in line with GDP
growth. In this frozen technology scenario the energy use is adjusted for annual energy
efficiency improvements only. The other component is the effect via changes in sector
composition and represents the energy intensity impact that results from higher income
levels and changes in consumer demand, and effects via domestic and international price
changes.
As shown in Fig. 9, there is a considerable structural component in China’s carbon
intensity reduction. The contrast to India is marked. Whereas the direct energy efficiency
components are fairly similar, the structural component of China reduces intensity by 38
percentage points, for India only 23 percentage points.
In the EU the reduction in CO2 intensity is predominantly from structural change,
whereas USA, Canada and Japan hardly are supported by structural change when reducing
their carbon intensity.
7 Comparison with other studies
When comparing our results with those from other studies, it is necessary to take into
account the differences embedded in the BAU scenarios and the underlying models.
Figure 10 compares the economic growth rates of our BAU scenario with some BAU
scenarios from other reports. The comparison cannot be exact because of somewhat different
definitions of regions and time period in the various reports. Nevertheless, Fig. 10 provides
Fig. 8 Historical and future (BAU) average annual changes in emission intensities. Source: http://cait.wri.org/
and own calculations
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some insights and references for our BAU-assumptions. In the figure, GWA refers to this
study, MMW refers to McKibbin et al. (2010), International Energy Outlook (IEO) refers to
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009) as reported by McKibbin et al. (op. cit.), den
Elzen refers to den Elzen et al. (2010), Jotzo refers to Jotzo (2010) and China Council for
International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) BAU refers to
China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (2009)
Fig. 9 Contribution from structural change and energy efficiency improvement to change of carbon intensity
from 2004 to 2020
Fig. 10 Comparing BAU average annual economic growth rates over the period 2005–2020 in different
studies
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providing a BAU economic growth rate only for China. Among the more rapidly growing
large economies, the largest variation in relative terms among studies is found for
Russia. Japan has the largest gap between growth forecasts. Interestingly, for China
we find a larger discrepancy among assumed or calculated economic growth rates than
for India. The overall impression from Fig. 10 is otherwise that our study assumes a
lower economic growth than most other reports and studies except for Japan. This is
likely to contribute to relatively lower economic costs of attaining the emission targets
pledged in the Copenhagen Accord in our study.
Figure 11 compares our BAU-emissions growth rates with those of other BAU emission
scenarios reported in the literature. Emission growth estimates vary considerably for China,
India and Russia. Our growth rates for China is at the lower end, for India more in line with
an average of the other studies, whereas we (GWA) find a much higher growth in Russian
emissions than the other studies.
Combining GDP growth rates and emission growth rates, we can compare how emission
intensities vary among the studies. This is depicted in Fig. 12.
We note that the relatively high emissions growth rates in McKibbin et al. (MMW)
(Fig. 11) is due to both a high economic growth rate and a low reduction rate in emission
intensities (Fig. 12). Among the studies covered here, emission intensities vary most for
China, Russia and India.
McKibbin et al. (MMW) operate implicitly with an annual reduction in energy intensity
of 1.3 % per year on average, whereas our study has 2.0 % per year.
The scope for energy efficiency in Russia has been huge, as overconsumption was
built into the Soviet industrial infrastructure (IEA 2009). In 2007, after more than 5 %
per year steady decline since year 2000, the energy intensity in Russia was still 3
times higher than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Europe average although 2/3 of the gap had been closed between 1998
and 2007 (IEA 2009). On that background a future annual reduction of 1.3 % as in
our study may seem somewhat low, U.S. Energy Information Administration (IEO)
assume a rate of 3.5 % per year.
Fig. 11 Average annual growths in CO2 emissions in different studies 2005–2020
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8 Conclusions
The Copenhagen Accord seems to be the bottom-up climate regime for the time being, with no
measures for ensuring compliance beyond the good intentions of nations to mitigate climate
change. However, several political factors support a core of realism of these intentions. In
particular there is substantial concern in many countries about energy security issues and local
air pollution, both providing good reasons for reducing greenhouse gas emission intensities in
addition to the concerns about climate change. The question is how much it will cost.
Our study of the case when mitigation efforts are directed towards fossil fuel use shows
that costs are moderate. Implementation of the Copenhagen Accord leads to less than 0.1
percentage point reduction in average annual economic growth during 2005–2020. All
regions except China and India experience declines in growth rates.
We estimate low costs to most regions as measured by the decline in GDP in 2020. Japan
seems the most vulnerable combining a high marginal cost of CO2 reduction with ambitious
pledges. Thus the marginal cost of CO2-reductions in Japan reaches above 100 USD/tCO2 in
2020. The recent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant and associated setback of
the nuclear power industry might, however, undermine this already challenging emission
target. For USA, EU and Canada the marginal CO2 cost settles around 21–27 USD/tCO2.
Global emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion will be 15 % or 4.6 Gt below BAU
in 2020 as a result of the Copenhagen Accord and 3 % below the 2005 emission level. India
and China raises emissions by 5 %, and 1 % respectively.
Emission intensities tend to be slightly higher in China and India under the Copenhagen
Accord, but declines in all other regions, above all in Japan. For China, structural changes in
the economy contribute twice as much to the 5 % annual reduction in emission intensity as
do energy efficiency improvement and general technological change.
We estimate some carbon leakages, but not to a serious and game changing extent. India,
China and Russia increase their net export of steel as share of production with more than
40 % by 2020, India with close to 30 %. Still, structural change in China and India remains
the dominating source factor behind their reductions in emissions intensities.
Fig. 12 Average annual emission intensity growth rates over the period 2005–2020 in BAU scenarios by
regions and studies
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